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(anthropocentric) moral humanists and the humane
moralists (or animallibemtionists) ought to be cooceived
as a triangular, not a polar, debate. He claims that the
Leopoldian position of land/environmental ethics
represents the third prong of the controversy. The main
shortcoming of the two earlier positions, argues
Callicott, is that they are atomistic, whereas land/
environment ethics is holistic.
Callicott's holistic environmental ethics "locates
ultimate value in the biotic community and assigns
differential moral value to the constitutive individuals
relatively to that standard.',2 Hence, as he argues in
Chapter Two, it makes no sense to attribute rights to
individual inanimate objects, because nature "does not
respect the rights of individuals."3 Because trophic
processes, for example, do not safeguard rights of
individuals, Callicott (in Chapter Three) follows
Leopold in providing "only 'respect' for individual
members of the biotic community, but 'biotic rights'
for species"; further, he says, "in the last analysis, 'the
integrity, beauty, and stability of the biotic community'
is the measure of right and wrong actions affecting the
environment.,,4
Defending Leopold's (and his) land ethics as
Darwinian and sociobiological, in Chapter Five
Callicott argues persuasively that the land ethic is a
natural result of the evolutionary extension of the
boundaries of the moral community. Once we see land

For nearly two decades, J. Baird Callicott has been
writing and teaching at the frontier of ethical theory.
Perhaps more than almost anyone else, Callicott has
been working to extend this frontier in ways that correct
the anthropocentric bias of many moral thinkers. Not
merely a philosopher who writes about environmental
issues, Callicott has been creating a new environmental
ethics, one grounded in the thought of Aldo Leopold.
His volume, In Defense ofthe Land Ethic. is an excellent
summary of his position. I It is also a good example of
his poetic brilliance and his most effective insights.
After highlighting the main contributions of
Callicott's book, I shall summarize some of (what I take
to be) his best ethical insights. In closing the discussion,
I shall suggest several reasons why community ecology
and natural selection may not be able to provide support
for all of the arguments in which Callicott and others
enlist their help.

Callicott's Contributions
In Chapter One of In Defense of the Land Ethic,
("Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair"), Callicott
argues that the familiar conflict between traditional
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feelings or sentiments which are, as it were, projected
onto objects, persons, or actions and affectively 'color'
them." 11 In so arguing, Callicott realizes that "intrinsic
or inherent value in nature in the strict, objective sense of
the terms must by definition be abandoned if one
assumes a Humean subjectivist axiology." Neverthe
less, he says, this subjectivist axiology allows natural
beings to "be valued for themselves."12 It also escapes
relativism, according to Callicott, because sociobiology
has achieved a "consensus of feeling" through the
"biologization of ethics." Human ethical feelings, he
claims, "have been standardized by natural selection."13
Moreover, he says, "since nature is the self fully
extended and diffused, and the self, complementarily.
is nature concentrated and focused ... nature is
intrinsically valuable to the extent that the self is
intrinsically valuable.,,14
Having explained various aspects of his environ
mental ethic, Callicott argues in Chapters Ten and
Eleven that American Indian cultures provided their
members with a land "wisdom" and an environmental
ethical ideal that could help guide us out of our
environmental malaise. In the next two chapters of his
volume, Callicott argues, respectively. that genuine
ecological education is the main way to reorient persons
toward a land/environmental ethic, and that land
aesthetics can contribute to the effort because it "calls
attention to the psychic-spiritual rewards of maintaining
the biological integrity and diversity of the rural
landscape."15

as a "biotic community," says Callicott, the land or
environmental ethic emerges. The "conceptual and
logical foundations of the land ethic," he says, are
evolutionary and ecological biology, "a Copernican
cosmology, a Darwinian protosociobiologicall18lural
history of ethics, Darwinian ties of kinship among all
forms of life on earth, and an Eltonian model of the
structure of biocenoses all overlaid on a Humean
Smithian moral psychology. Its logic is that natural
selection has endowed human beings with an affective
moral response to perceived bonds of kinship and
community membership and identity; that today the
natural environment, the land, is represented as a
community." 5 More specifteally, Callicott argues that
the biotic community, currcntly vicwed as the
ecosystem, has moral considerability because it is the
object of a specially evolved public affection that all
psychologically nonnal humans have inherited from a
long line of primates.6
In Callicott's view, the biotic community has not
only moral considerability but primacy; he writes, "not
only are other sentient creatures members of the biotic
community and subordinate to its integrity, beauty, and
stability; so are we. .. , human beings are equally subject
to the same subordination of individual welfare and
rights in respect to the good of the community as a
whole. ,,7 Callicott claims, however, that this
subordination does not lead to what Regan calls
"environmental fascism," devaluing humans in the
name of environmental welfare. Callicott maintains
that such fascism cannot occur because humans are stilll
bound to respect individual human rights: "prior moral
sensibilities and obligations attendant upon and
correlative to prior~trata of social involvement remain
operative and preemptive."s
.
Although CaIlioott's and l..eqJold's landIenviromnentai
ethic rests on "the ecological concept of a biotic
community,"9 Callicott goes to some length to defend
the intrinsic value of nonhuman species. At least part
of his motivation is the widespread species extinctions
occurring all over the planet.10
Providing for the intrinsic value of natural entities
and nature as a whole, however, is problematic because
this value apparently must be grounded in some property
of abe entity. Yet anyone could reasonably deny that a
particular natural or metaphysical property, e.g.,
"richness," is truly good. To counter this difficulty,
Callicott argues in Chapter Nine that "good and evil,
like beauty and ugliness, rest in the fmal analysis upon
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CaUicott's Ethical Insights

Apart from whether one agrees with all aspects of
Callicott's subjectivist environmental ethics, he has
brought a number of insights to the study of how and
why we value nature. I shall mention only four of these
insights. First, in ChapterTwo, Callicott points out that
one of the difficulties with the animal-rights position is
that often its proponents do not distinguish human
domestic communities (that include nonhuman animals)
from natural or wild biotic communities. Instead. he
argues, they say that being a subject of a life (in some
sense) is sufficient for being a rights-holder.t 6 Apart
from whether most animalliberationists fall victim to
this error,17 Callicott's insight is a correct one. This is
that the community concept is essential to the notion of
moral obligation, and that different kinds of commu
nities undergird different moral obligations. The insight
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it is questionable whether a principled and rational
morality is ever able to develop. Callicott's emphasis
on feelings as the originators of morality is important,
in part, because it forces those of us inlerested in moral
education to emphasize the development of the whole
person, not just to nurture her ability to engage in
rational analysis. His insight is also significant because
it enables environmentalists to begin environmental
education at the level of feeling, at the level of
experiences in nature, that Holmes Rolston recognized
as crucial.19 Both these benefits would have been lost,
had Callicott taken a more traditional, rationalistic
approach to the origins of moral development

is important, not only because much of contemporary
ethics is erroneously individualistic/atomistic but also
because significant philosophical discussions tum on
the necessity of a shared moral community as the basis
ofduties to community members. Indeed, many of the
arguments about rights to future generations focus on
whether present and future persons can share the same
kind of moral community (have the same conception
of the good) as we do. Hence Callicott's point is not
only helpful to his own argument but also central to
moral philosophy in general.
Another Callicott insight, admittedly one noted by
other thinkers as well, is that, throughout history we
have gradually extended the boundaries of our moral
community (Chapter Five). We have expanded our
ethical sensitivities from while males to include blacks,
women, children, the insane, persons spatially and
Iemporally removed from us, all living beings, and even
the natural environment. In emphasizing this important
truth of descriptive ethics, Callicott challenges us both
to broaden ourown sensitivities and to rethink classical
ethical theory.
Likewise, in a significant departure from traditional
ethical theory, Callicott insightfully follows Hume and
Darwin in arguing that altruism is as fundamental in
human nature as egoism. and that there are inborn
natural sentiments that have society as their natural
object 18 Given the postulated egoism of the two main
schools of modem moral philosophy (the deontological
and the utilitarian), as Goodpasterreeognizes, Callicott's
taking the "higher road" of altruism is nothing short of
refreshing and prophetic. The rational grounds for his
doing so are compelling, because most arguments that
all actions are done for self-serving reasons presuppose
a tautological definition of "selfserving" and are hence
nonfalsifiable, nonempirical, and highly ideological.
The psychological and political grounds for endorsing
Callicott's founding moral philosophy on altruism are
that positing such a foundation, even if it cannot be
proved, is the only possible way of hoping to avoid
narcissism. Otherwise, egoism will be a self-fulfilling
prophecy for us all.
Finally, although I do not believe that "naturally
selected" feelings justify particular ethical stances (see
the arguments of the next section), Callicott is insightful
when he argues that many moral values originate in the
feelings. This insight locates the psychological
beginnings (if not the justification) or morality in the
correct place. Indeed without feelings like compassion,
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Problems with Biological and Ethical Holism
With so much to praise in Callicott, especially his
insistence on the importance of altruism and expanding
our moral communities, are there areas in which his
views are arguably false? The answer to this question,
for me, is "yes," and the grounds for this response are,
in part, biological. These are that (1) there is no
biologically coherent notion of "community" robust
enough to ground either contemporary scientific theory
in community ecology or environmental ethics; (2)
contrary to Callicott's suggestion in Chapter Two, it is
not possible to safeguard the interests of biological
communities; and (3) in relying on natural-selection
mechanisms to deliver it from relativism, Callicott's
evolutionary ethics has lost its normative dimension.
Let's examine these three points in order.
Following Leopold, Callicott argues that all creatures
are subordinate to the integrity, beauty, and stability of
the biotic community (see note 7). This imperative is
problematic from a biological point of view because
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health is relative to some specific goal, and how to
define the system at issue. The ecological problem of
defining the system at issue is analogous to the
economic problem of defining a theory of social choice
and choosing some "whole" that aggregates or
represents numerous individual choices.
Defining an ecological "whole" to which Callicott
and Leopold can refer is especially problematic, both
because the biologists (e.g., Clements, Elton, Forbes)
cited by Callicott to explicate his views are no longer
accepted by contemporary scientists as being correct,
and because the contemporary variant of Clements'
position, the GAIA hypothesis, has been rejected by
most ecologists as unproved metaphor or mere
speculation. They admit the scientific facts of
interconnectedness and coevolution on a small scale,
but they point out that ecosystems and communities do
not persist through time. Hence there is no clear referent
for the alleged "dynamic stability" of an ecosystem or
community.28
Moreover, it is not clear which (of many) alleged
ecological communities it is whose balance or stability
ought to be sought. One could seek to stabilize
(whatever that means) the ecosystem,29 or the
association,30 or the trophic level, for example. Or, if
one is a holist, then why should not the collection of
communities and ecosystems be optimized, namely, the
biosphere? Optimizing the well-being of a particular
community typically leads neither to the optimization
of another community, nor to that of the biosphere, nor
to that of a particular association. If not, than Callicott
has no scientific basis for choosing a given "whole" as
the unit that is to be optimized.31 One can make a value
judgment to optimize the well-being of a particular
community or the biosphere, or some ecosystem, but
this is just that, a value judgment. Such a judgment is
not part of ecological science.
Admittedly, once one makes a value judgment
about which particular whole one wants to stabilize
or balance, it is obvious that particular ecological
conclusions are valid within certain spatial and temporal
scales. Nevertheless Po given ecological conclusion
regarding balance or integrity, for example, typically
holds for some "wholes," e.g., communities, but not
for others. Ecologists cannot optimize the welfare of
all the different wholes (each having a different spatial
and temporal scale) at the same time. Because they
cannot, there is no general level at which ecological
problem solving takes place. Hence there is no general

there is a clear notion neither of balance, integrity, or
stability, nor of community. There is, for example, no
clear sense in which one can claim that natural
ecosystems proceed toward homeostasis, stability, or
some balance.20 Likewise there is no consensus among
ecologists on the ecosystemic view of balance or
stability,21 and almost no support for the diversity
stability view held by MacArthur, Hutchinson, and
CommonerP The reasons for the disfavor atlributed
to the view of MacArthur, et al are both empirical and
theoretical. Salt marshes and the rocky intertidal are
two of the many counterexamples to the diversity
stability view,23 and empirically based counterexamples
have multiplied over the last two decades. May, Levins,
Connell, and others have seriously challenged the
diversity-stability hypothesis on both mathematical and
field-based grounds.24 Even though some laypersons
and policymakers appeal to the hypothesis,25 most
ecologists have either repudiated it or cast strong doubt
on il 26
Doubts about balance and stability have arisen, in
part, because ecologists cannot say what it would be,
in a non-question-begging way, to hinder some balance,
stability, or integrity. This is because communities and
ecosystems regularly change and regularly eliminate
species. Nature doesn't merely extirpate species or
cause them to move elsewhere because their niches are
gone. And if not, then there are no clear ecological
grounds for defining and preserving some balance or
stability. Hence it is not clear that Leopold's and
Callicott's appeal to ecology can help environmental
ethics in any precise, scientific wayP
It will not do to say that what happens naturally
is good, whereas what happens through human inter
vention is bad; this would be to solve the problem of
defining "balance" or "stability" in a purely stipulative
or ad hoc way. Nor can the criterion be merely that it is
wrong for humans to do quickly (e.g., cause lake
eutrophication) what nature does more slowly. One
would need an argument (given neither by Callicott nor
.Leopold) that accelerating ecosystemic changes is bad,
even if the changes themselves are natural.
Another conceptual problem besetting environmental
appeals to ecological balance, wholeness, or integrity
is that ecologists must take into account thousands of
different communities, species, and individuals, all
relative to the health or balance of an ecosystem or the
biosphere. It is unclear both how to define the health
of a system (as opposed to an individual), since system
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temporal or spatial scale within which a stable "whole"
is exhibited.
Because there is no universal ecological theory that
can be appealed to in derming the "whole" about which
Leopold and Callicott speak, ecologists are forced to
work on acase-by-case basis. They recognize that there
is no universal level, across all communities, at which
some balanced or stable whole exists. In part this is
because numerous alleged "wholes," e.g., populations,
exhibit density vagueness rather than density
dependence, while other wholes do not.32 It is also
because many ecosystemic or holistic explanations are
neither falsifiable nor even testable. This is why at least
one scientist called ecosystems ecology "theological
ecology.,,33 There is neither a clear definition of what
it is to be balanced or stable, nor a clear definition of
the whole that is allegedly balanced or stable. This is
ultimately because theorists do not agree on the
underlying processes that structure communities and
ecosystems.34

question-begging argument that humans ought to
respect communities?
A third problem with Callicott's using biology to
undergird his environmental ethics is that he destroys
the normative dimension of his ethics. This occurs
because Callicott reasons, quite correctly, that in relying
on a Humean notion of ethics, he is open to the charge
of ethical relativism. He avoids this relativism by
postulating that ethical uniformity/unanimity is
achieved by means of natural selection. He says
"human feelings ...have been standardized by natural
selection" (see note 13). The problem this creates,
however, is that one cannot be morally bound to do
something against natural selection or against his
genetic make-up. And one cannot be praised for acting
in accord with natural selection. Either a certain ethical
tendency is selected for, or it is not. This means that
behavioral uniformities that are explained through
natural selection are descriptive, not normative. Hence
Callicott has admittedly saved his ethics from
relativism, but at the price of its "oughtness" or
normative character.
A similar situation occurs when epistemologists
attempt to explain rules or norms of knowing by means
of natural selection; their "evolutionary epistemology,"
apart from its other problems, is naturalized, descriptive,
and non-normative. It is no longer epistemology, but
psychology.37 Like evolutionary epistemology,
Callicott's evolutionary ethics runs into these same
problems. Why does this follow? There are at least
three difficulties with appealing to natural selection
as a way of grounding evolutionary ethics. First,
arriving at ethical beliefs/actions relies on cognitive and
evaluative aims, on anticipating experience, solving
problems, and so on. The evolution : ethics analogy
therefore breaks down because, although evolution does
not operate according to ends or aims, ethics does.
Moreover, evolution and natural selection ignore the
contribution to reflective self-understanding of
ourselves as agents of inquiry, while this reflective
agency is at the core of ethical knowledge.38 Moreover,
the natural selection explanation fails to explain how
someone could make the first correct ethical guess or
have the first ethical feeling; at best, natural selection
could only explain later correct guesses or feelings. 39
Evolution and ethics are also disanalogous in that,
in ethics, we select theories/behavior on the basis of
hypotheses about the facts and our evaluations of
them. In evolution, however, each variation arises

A second biological problem with Callicott's
grounding environmental ethics on ecology occurs in
Chapters Two and Three. There he argues in favor of
duties to the biotic community and against according
rights to individual members of the biotic community.
He argues against the latter because he says that it is
not possible to safeguard the rights of each individual;
such a "safeguard" would stop all trophic processes
beyond photosynthesis.35
The biological problem with Callicott's reasoning
here is that nature does not respect communities either.
There is strong biological evidence (e.g., fossilized
pollens) of radical changes in community composition
and structure throughout history. These changes in
community composition and structure, in tum, suggest
that there is no such thing as a stable or balanced
community "type" existing through time. Rather the
types only appear stable because our time frame of
examination is relatively short. Even if climate and
environment remained the same, communities could
not be classified into balanced or stable "types" on
the basis of climate. Both spatial and temporal
fluctuations undercut any universal notion of a stable
or balanced community.36 And if so, then the same
argument that Callicott uses against Regan (in his
Chapters Two and Three) can be used against him.
Nature does not respect communities so, on
Callicott's own terms (this is not an argument that I
would make), how can he avoid a stipulative and
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independently of the adaptive needs of the organism.
The facts themselves, not our theories or evaluations
of them, guide evolution. Hence evolution is blind to
the adaptive needs of the organism, whereas ethics is
blind to the facts, and can see only hypotheses about
the facts. 40
A third difficulty with Callicott's (or any)
evolutionary ethics is that he uses it to move from
biological theory to realistic ethics. But for this
inference to be successful, we must know that the
organism has an accurate representation of the
environment. We don't know this. 41 For all these
reasons, Callicott's appeal to natural selection appears
to create more philosophical problems than it solves.

2 Callicott, LE, p. 37.
3 Callicott, LE, p. 43.
4 Callicott, LE, pp. 51, 58.

5 Callicott, LE, pp. 82-83.
6 Callicott, LE, p. 86.
7 Callicott, LE, pp. 92-93.

8 Callicott, LE, p. 93.
9 Callicott, LE, p. 126.
10 Callicott, LE, pp. 154-155.

Conclusion

11 Callicott, LE, p. 160.

If Callicott is unable to use natural selection and
community ecology to "bail out" environmental ethics,
then where do we go from here? Clearly Callicott
deserves high praise for showing us much of what is
wrong with traditional moral philosophy. Nevertheless,
my own preferences are for a metaphysical account that
posits intrinsic value in nature itself, an account that
deviates only slightly from that of Paul Taylor (see note
17). Admittedly, however, there is neither time nor
space to discuss such an account here. If my preferences
eventually prove to be correct, then despite Callicott's
poetic brilliance and his creative appeal to biology, we
must follow a path somewhat different from his.
Perhaps ultimately we must rely more on metaphysics,
and less on biological science, if we wish to build (or
discover) an environmental ethics. Just as we learned
that there are no "technological fixes" that will give us
easy answers to environmental problems, perhaps also
there are no "scientific fixes" (like natural selection)
that will give us easy answers to ethical problems.
Callicott has helped us begin to ask the hard questions.

12 Callicott, LE, p. 161.
13 Callicott, LE, p. 164.
14 Callicott, LE, p. 174.
15 Callicott, LE, p. 201.
16 Callicott, LE, p. 47.
17See Paul Taylor, Respect for Nature (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1986). Taylor clearly makes
the distinction between natural and domestic communities
of animals.
18 Callicott, LE, pp. 84-85,142-143.
19 See Hohnes Rolston, Philosophy Gone Wild (Buffalo:
Prometheus, 1986), esp. pp. 221-262.
20 P. Taylor, for example, urges us to "preserve ecological
integrity" (Taylor, Respect. p. 299) but he never tells us what
ecological integrity is.

Notes

21 Taylor, for example, denies that ecology can infonn
environmental ethics (Taylor, Respect, p. 8).

The biological part of this work was supported
by NSF grant BBS-8619533. The opinions
expressed are those of the author and not the
National Science Foundation.

22 See Mark Sagoff, "Fact and Value in Environmental
Science," Environmental Ethics 7:2 (Summer 1985) : 107-110;
hereafter cited as: Sagoff, Fact. See also Taylor, Respect, p. 8.
23 M. SagofI, "Environmental Science and Environmental
Law," (College Park, Maryland: Center for Philosophy and
Public Policy, March, 1985), unpublished essay, p. 109;
hereafter cited as: ES.

1 J. Baird Callicott, In Defense ofthe Land Ethic: Essays
in Environmental Philosophy (Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1989); hereafter cited as Callicott, LE.
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32 Many ecologists follow the Platonic, holistic paradigm
ofreifying and studying organic entities like ecosystems. while
others follow the nominalistic and reductionistic paradigm
of exarning the individual or the species and refrain from
creating higher-level holistic entities such as ecosystems.
Neither side has won acceptance, but most of the predictive
power is on the side of the reductionists. despite the fact that
advances are possible through holistic approaches. McIntosh.
Background, pp. 126 ff.• 157 ff., 181-182 ff. and 252; see K.
Shrader-Frechette. "Organismic Biology and Ecosystems
Ecology," in Current Issues in Teleology, ed. by N. Rescher
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Center for the
Philosophy of Science. 1986), pp. 77-92; hereafter cited as:
Biology. For information on density dependence, see D.
Strong, "Density Vagueness: Abiding the Variance in the
Demography of Real Populations," in Community &ology,
ed. by J. Diamond and T. Case (New York: Harper and
Row,1986).

24 See works by May, Levins, and Connell cited in note
26; see also Sagoff, Fact, p. 109, and R. P. McIntosh, The
Background of Ecology: Coru:ept and Theory (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 187-188; hereafter
cited as: Background.
25 See, for example, U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional
Record, 93rd Congress, First Session, 119 (24 July 1973):
25668; B. Commoner, The Closing Circle (New York: Knopf,
1971), p. 38; andN.Myers.A Wealth ofWild Species (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1983).

26 See Sagoff, Fact, p. 107. See Also R. T. Paine, "ANote
on Trophic Complexity and Community Stability," American
Naturalist 103 (1969): 91-93; R. Lewin. "Fragile Forests
Implied by Pleistocene Data," Science 226 0984): 36-37; R.
M. May, Stability and Complexity in Model Ecosystems
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973); R. Levins,
"The Qualitative Analysis of Partially Specified Systems,"
Annals ofthe New York Academy ofSciences 231 (1974): 123
138; 1. H. Connell. "Diversity in Tropical Rain Forests and
Coral Reefs," Science 199 (1978): 1302-1310; Daniel
Goodman, "The Theory of Diversity-Stability Relationships
in Ecology," The Quarterly Review of Biology 50: 3
(September 1975): 237-266. See also M. E. Soule,
"Conservation Biology and the 'Real World'," in Soule, CB,
pp. 6-7, who argues that diversity-stability can be said to be a
working hypothesis, even though it fails to have the empirical
backing to satisfy experts and even though there are several
categorical exceptions to it. Finally see R. P. McIntosh,
Background, p. 142.

33 McIntosh, Background, p. 193. Ecosystems ecology is
allegedly empirical, but the ecosysternic entity about which
it centers is not defmed clearly. Ecosystems can be of many
kinds and many sizes. This being so, it is not precisely clear
that particular claims about ecosystems are falsifiable.
34 What pattern of excellence is it which an ecosystem
maximizes? Ecologists cannot answer the question. Theorists
such as Diamond and Gilpin, following MacArthur, claim
that interspecific competition is a major factor in patterning
natural processes of ecosystems. Other ecologists. such as
Simberloff and Strong, argue that the Diamond and Gilpin
theories are untestable. Strong and Simberloff have created
numerous null models which (they claim) indicate that
observed patterns of species occurrence do not depart from
what one would expect if associations were purely random.
(See M. Cody and 1. Diamond (eds.), &ology and the Evolution
of Communities (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1975); D. Strong et al. (eds.), Ecological Communities
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), especially M.
Gilpin and 1. Diamond, "Are Species Co-occurrences... ?,"
pp.298-315. See also D. S. Simberloff, "Competition Theory,
Hypothesis Testing, and Other Community Ecological Buzz
words," American Naturalist 122 (1983): 626-635.
Moreover, the evolutionary foundations of ecology seem
to suggest that many, many different happenings in ecosystems
might be stable, integral, and balanced. It is not clear that
there is a moral reason, short of human welfare, to prefer one
temporal arrangement or stability over another. In other
words, the evolutionary foundations of ecology seem to
undercut a precise defmition of stability, at least a defmition
formulated in purely non-anthropocentric terms. Admittedly
it is easy to formulate some defmition of stability in terms of
human needs and interests, but this is precisely what
proponents ofholism typically want to avoid doing; they want
a non-anthropocentric environmental ethics.

'n See the previous note.
28 See Taylor, Respect, pp. 45-46, 225-226. 246, 259,
281-282.

29 See R. MacArthur, "Fluctuations ofAnimal Populations.
and a Measure of Community Stability," &ology 36 (1955):
533-536 (hereafter cited as Fluctuations); Daniel Goodman,
'The Theory of Diversity-Slability Relationships in Ecology,"
The Quarterly Review of Biology 50 (1975): 237-266;
hereafter cited as: Theory. Note also that different camps of
ecologists would probably claim that different units ought to
be maximized.
30 Ecologists who follow Clements are likely to make this
claim. See McIntosh, Background, pp. 44.79,107.

31 McIntosh, Background, pp. 228. 252-256. B. Norton,
"Environmental Ethics and the Rights of Nonhumans,"
Environmental Ethics 4 (1982): 17-36, raises a similar point.
See McIntosh, Background. for a discussion of community
ecology (pp. 69-146, 263-267), population ecology (pp. 146
193), and ecosystems ecology (pp. 193-242).
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But if there is no accepted natural process followed by
ecosystems that are "maximizing excellence," then how did
competition become so entrenched in "explaining"
ecosystemic processes? One scientist claims that competition
has survived as an hypothesis merely because it fits in with
our notions of homeostasis and the balance of nature. (R.
Levin, "Santa Rosalia Was a Goat," Science 221 [12 August
1983]: 636-639.) If this is so, and I think that it is, then
ecology is in the midst of a revolution, Kulmian or not, to
overthrow entrenched and untestable competitionism. This
is a significant revolution because competitionism allegedly
provides the major explanation of the processes underlying
natural systems: it allegedly explains the "machine" which
drives the ecosystem to maximize something or other called
"excellence."
3S Callicott,

38 Hookway, pp. 13-15, makes similar points. See also
O'Hear, pp. 27-29.

39 Even if we need blind variation to acquire new
knowledge, moral progress could not occur if the variation
were totally blind. Moreover, the sociobiologist is unable to
explain the probability of the first correct ethical stance. (P.
Skagestad, '"faking Evolution Seriously: Critical Comments
on D. T. Campbell's Evolutionary Epistemology," in TN!
Monist 61, No.4 (October 1978): 615, makes a similar point;
hereafter cited as: Skagestad.) And if not, then he has not
explained ethics as we know it
40 The opportunism of biological evolution has no
counterpart in the evolution of ethics because evolution is
characterized by blindness before the fact and wisdom after
the fact, whereas ethics is not wholly wise either before or
after the fact. Once we grant that ethical stances are selected
in part on the ground of hypotheses about the facts, rather
than on the ground of the facts themselves, then the blindness
of hypothesis formation is carried over to the stage of
hypothesis selection. Hence evolution is not blind in the way
that moral evolution is blind. Why should one say these two
cases are similar, and that they both involve natural selection?
They are wildly disanalogous. Skagestad, p. 617, makes a
similar point.

LE, pp. 43, 51.

36 See the Strong reference in note 32. See also M.
Davis, "Climatic Instability, Time Lags, and Community
Disequilibrium," and R. Graham, "Response of Mammalian
Communities to Environmental Changes During the Late
Quaternary," in Community Ecology, eds. 1. Diamond and T.
Case (New York: Harper and Row, 1986), pp. 269-284 and
300-313.
37 Our arriving at a particular ethical stance, on a
sociobiological account, is not determined by our current
experience, or whether we think the stance is morally
justifiable, or whether or not it is a correction of previous
erroneous stances. This is because neither in the production
of evolutionary variations nor in the elimination of
disadvantageous variations is there any reference to an end
of producing "fit" species. Adaptive needs have little to do
with the promotion of moral goodness. Hence there is litde
reason to believe that millions of years of evolution should
"guarantee" anything, especially moral value. This is because,
within evolutionary theory, the probability of variation
occurring is independent of the need for a change to produce
a better fit between organisms and the environment Within
the knowledge process, however, the probability of a varied
hypothesis occurring is not independent of the need for a
change to produce a better fit between a moral stance and the
facts. See W. Bartley, "Philosophy of Biology Versus
Philosophy of Physics," in G. Radnitzky and W. Bardey, 008.,
Evolutioruuy Epistemology, Rationality. and tN! Sociology
ofKnowledge (La Salle, IDinois: Open Court, 1987), pp. 24
25, who makes similar points regarding evolutionary
epistemology. See also A. O'Hear, "Has the Theory of
Evolution Any Relevance to Philosophy?" Ratio XXIX (1
June 1987): 19-23; hereafter cited as: o 'Hear. Finally see
C. Hookway, "Naturalism, FalIibilism, and Evolutionary
Epistemology," in C. Hookway, ed., Minds, Machines. and
Evolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984),
pp. 1-16; hereafter cited as: Hookway.
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O'Hear, p. 25, makes a similar point.
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